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Abstract 
This paper focuses on the interdependence between international trade and 
in institutional reform, and suggests that the trade barriers erected by 
advanced countries to the agricultural exports from poor countries, and sub-
Saharan agriculture in particular, are a barrier to economic growth and 
development.  Drawing upon recent literature, the suggestion is that trade 
barriers inhibit institutional reform which is a major factor affecting 
economic growth. An empirical analysis of trade reform and economic 
growth shows that sub-Saharan economies can repeat potential gains from 
increased trade that are larger when such integration with world markets 
induces institutional reform. 
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1. Introduction 
    The surge in real income growth during the last three decades of the 20-th 
century lifted more people from poverty than any previous time in world 
history.  The $1/day poverty rate has fallen from 20 percent of the world's 
population to 5 percent over the last twenty five years.  The $2/day rate has 
fallen from 44 percent to 18 percent.  There are between 300 and 500 million 
less poor people in 1998 than there were in the 1970s (Sala-i-Martin, 2001: 
16-18).  Economists associate this unprecedented rise in wellbeing to the 
fundamental economic forces driving the globalizing of world markets 
(Sachs and Warner, 1995, and Baldwin and Martin, 2000).   
    Nevertheless, many regions of the world are not participating in what 
might be termed the gains from globalization.  About 19 percent of the 
world's population live on only 1.3 percent of the world's income (Shane, 
Teigen, Gehlhar, and Roe, 2000: 300-302).  In sub-Saharan Africa (SSA), 
approximately 52 percent of the population live on two 1987 purchasing 
power parity dollars per day or less.  This population lives on roughly 12 
percent of the region’s income.  Countries in South Asia are the next poorest 
group.  About 25 percent of their population live on 5.5 percent of the 
region’s income.   3 
    The main features of economic growth in real per capita incomes are 
easily identified.  They include growth in the stock of human and physical 
capital, technological change, and for most countries, the transition of labor 
out of agriculture and other primary good producing sectors of the economy, 
and into higher value added sectors of manufacturing and services.  
Fundamental to this transition is the micro-firm level environment that 
provides incentives and opportunities for productivity growth, including 
variety and quality of products that allow markets to remunerate resources at 
sustained and growing rates of return.  For most countries, this environment 
cannot be created in isolation from the rest of the world.  Countries with 
strong and sustained records of economic growth engage in the international 
transfers of physical and human capital, including the business practices and 
technical expertise of foreign companies and foreign expertise in services 
such as banking and insurance. 
    Macroeconomic policies such as fiscal, monetary, exchange rate and trade 
policy are necessary but not sufficient to create this micro-firm level 
environment.  Institutions granting enforceable rights to physical and 
intellectual property, to govern competition among firms, legal structures to 
adjudicate commercial disputes, development of codes of conduct to assure 
transparent financial institutions, and the provision of public goods for   4 
transport and education that can be sustained by what the polity considers to 
be within the realm of the social good, are critical components of the micro-
firm level environment necessary to encourage the adoption of new 
technologies and capital deepening.  The daunting question is how to create 
the necessary institutions?   
2. Focus and organization of the paper 
    It is likely that institutional reform is interdependent with globalization.  
Then the question is: which comes first, productivity and growth from which 
evolve institutions, or institutions from which evolve productivity and 
growth?  Is foreign trade a vehicle for inducing institutional change?  But if 
this is the case, then is it possible that the agricultural trade barriers of the 
advanced nations are a barrier to institutional reform of low income 
countries whose economies are relatively dependent upon agriculture?  The 
purpose of this paper is to discuss and bring some evidence to bear on these 
questions, particularly as this relates to sub-Saharan agriculture. 
    The paper begins with an overview of the recent literature on geography, 
institutions and international trade as an explanation for the differences in 
income levels between advanced an poor nations.  This discussion suggests 
the link between institutions and the economic opportunities, opportunities   5 
precipitated by the same forces that are inducing the globalization of 
markets, may be a deriving force for institutional change. 
    Whether sub-Saharan countries can benefit from more trade, and hence 
induce institutional reform, depends on whether they can expand their trade 
opportunities.  Since these are primary commodity exporters, of which for 
most this means agriculture products, their agricultural trade patterns are 
briefly reviewed.  This review suggests these countries tend to export 
commodities for which the advanced economies pursue import-substitution 
polices.  Is it possible that these policies are more than a barrier to trade, but 
that they are also a barrier to institutional reform in many of sub-Saharan 
countries?  Drawing upon previous work, the importance of these barriers to 
trade are shown.  The last subsection focus on an analysis of sub-Saharan 
Africa to show how the effects of possible increases in total factor 
productivity that is linked to institutional and trade reform can greatly raise 
per capita income over a forty year period.  Final remarks conclude the 
paper. 
3. Overview of sources of economic growth 
  Three lines of thought have emerged to explain the key sources of 
economic growth.  One line centers on geography (Bloom and Sachs, 2001) 
as a determinant of climate, natural resource endowments, disease burden,   6 
transport costs and the extent of diffusion of technology, all of which are 
associated with the low income countries of sub-Saharan Africa and South 
Asia.  Bloom and Sachs suggest that the geographic features associated with 
poor economies also foster extractive forms of governance.  Another line of 
thought centers on international trade as a driver of productivity change and 
income growth.  Levin, R and D. Renelt (1992) were among the first to 
establish a strong statistical evidence for a positive growth to trade linkage.  
This linkage was later reinforced by others (e.g., Sachs and Warner (1995)), 
and further developed by Coe, Helpman, and Hoffmaister (1997) who 
identified R&D spillovers among nations due to the technology content 
embodied in imports and exports that stimulated growth. 
    The third line of thought focuses on institutions.  Recent work in this area 
is that of Rodrik, Subramanian, and Trebbi (2002), and MacFarlan, Edison 
and Spatafora (2003).  Rodrik et al. (2002),  use a composite indicator to 
capture the protection afforded to property rights and the strength of the rule 
of law.  These are referred to as market-creating institutions since markets 
either do not exist or perform poorly in their absence. This indicator over 
time and countries allows them to distinguish between geography, trade and 
institutions in explaining the gap between rich and poor countries.  They 
conclude from their empirical analysis that the quality of institutions is the   7 
only positive and significant determinant of income levels.  Once institutions 
are controlled for, integration (i.e. foreign trade) has no direct effect on 
incomes, while geography has at best weak direct effects.  However, 
integration was also found to have a positive impact on institutional quality.  
This result suggests that trade can have an indirect effect on incomes by 
improving institutional quality.  We return to this theme later. 
    MacFarlan et al. (2003) focus on the role of institutions on three 
dimensions of economic performance: the level of economic development, 
growth, and volatility of growth.  They include the indicators used by Rodrik 
et al. (2002), plus indicators for quality of governance, extent of corruption, 
and limits placed on political leaders.  In the case of sub-Saharan Africa, 
they conclude that raising the quality of institutions (i.e., increasing the 
aggregate governance index) in sub-Saharan Africa to the average level of 
the index for the Middle East and Turkey would cause an astonishing 80 
percent increase in real income from $800 per capita to $1,400, (MacFarlan 
et al. (2003): 106).  In terms of the rate of economic growth, they conclude 
that improving institutional quality by one standard deviation (this is 
equivalent to moving the index for Cameroon up to the all-country average) 
would increase the rate of growth of sub-Saharan region by 1.7 percentage 
points.     8 
4. Linking trade and institutional reform 
    Institutional reform induced by economic events can be illustrated using 
the case of Mexico in the 1980s.  Shane, 1992: 90-91 suggests that the 
prospect of long term stagnation of the Mexican economy, and declining per 
capita incomes undermined confidence in the Institutional Revolutionary 
Party.  Under the leadership of Salinas, major policy initiatives were made 
as early as 1988 when Mexico joined the GATT.  Many of the country’s 
state owned enterprises were liquidated and privatized, and limits on foreign 
ownership shares in Mexican companies were relaxed.  These changes 
removed instruments of the state that were most prone to rent seeking on the 
part of special interests, and in the process, initiated major institutional 
reforms that while extending rights to foreign interests in the domestic 
economy also extend rights to Mexican citizens and limited the power of 
elite special interest groups.  Institutional reform was initiated when the 
difference between the prospect of stagnation compared to the opportunities 
of opening the country to world markets offered sufficient potential to 
induce a change in policy.  This “trickle” down institutional change is still 
on-going. 
    Rodrik (2002: 4-6) lists property rights, regulatory institutions, institutions 
for macroeconomic stabilization (e.g., managing fiscal deficits), institutions   9 
for social insurance, and institutions for conflict management as critical for 
development.  Countries that have gained much from reform have developed 
and strengthened those institutions whose services markets use relatively 
intensively, especially those markets that accommodate the decline in cost of 
exchanging information.  These include the establishment of low cost 
enforcement of physical and intellectual property rights, efficient low cost 
adjudication of commercial disputes, development of transparent financial 
institutions that are open to international competition, harmonization of 
business codes for goods and services, the unbiased provision of public 
service to international firms, and the management of activity that restricts 
competition in markets for final goods and factors of production.  These 
reforms facilitate the entry of foreign firms, the industrial country out-
sourcing of component fabrication and assembly, and increase the growth in 
capital stock by attracting foreign savings. 
    Rodrik (2002: 9) notes that no country has developed successfully by 
turning its back on international trade and long-term capital flows. However, 
he suggests it is equally true that no country has developed simply by 
opening itself up to foreign trade and investment without engaging in 
fundamental institutional reform.  Countries that have engaged in trade 
reform, without the reform of other policies and accompanying institutions,   10 
have experienced at least one economic collapse, including Turkey, 
Indonesia, Argentina.  In the case of Mexico, it may be conjectured that the 
collapses experienced led to a strengthening and reform of her institutions. 
    This discussion suggests that while trade reform is not sufficient to induce 
institutional reform, a link between the two nevertheless exists. Trade reform 
entails: the importation of institutions from abroad; membership in the WTO 
requires the adoption of a set of institutional norms that rent seekers find 
more costly to change; financial integration raises the premium for 
macroeconomic stability, the freer flow of information encourages civil 
liberties and political freedom, government enforcement to protect the rights 
of foreign investors induces government to become more inclined to protect 
the basic human rights of its own citizens as well. 
    If foreign trade is an important link to institutional reform, what evidence 
suggests that the agro-climatic endowments of sub-Saharan Africa are 
conducive for an expansion of trade, and if so, with whom?  Are the 
agricultural policies of the U.S. and the E.U. a barrier to increasing 
agricultural exports from sub-Saharan Africa?  If these barriers were 
removed, and institutional change occurred that led to gains suggested by 
Rodrik et al. (2002), and MacFarlan, et al. (2003), what is the approximate   11 
magnitude of these gains?  These questions are addressed in the remaining 
sections of the paper. 
 
5. Do sub-Saharan agricultural trade patterns suggest possible gains 
from trade? 
    The potential for countries to benefit from the lowering of agricultural 
trade barriers among themselves, and barriers erected by advanced countries 
should depend, in part, on the share of agriculture in their total trade, and on 
their agricultural trade pattern. In our previous work, Diao, Roe and 
Somwaru (2002: 783), we show that agricultural exports accounted for more 
than 40 percent of total exports for a relatively large grouping of seven 
developing country regions, and to range from 15 to 30 percent for a larger 
eleven developing country grouping.  For the entire set of developing 
countries in the world, the share of agriculture in total trade averaged about 
10 percent.  Agricultural export shares for the thirty-three sub-Saharan 
countries ranged from 20 to 80 percent of total exports. 
    Pertaining to trade patterns, Diao, Somwaru and Roe, (2001: 27) show the 
importance of three of the largest markets in the world, (Japan and Korea, 
North America, and the EU), to the exports of agriculture from developing 
countries.  Excluding intra-EU trade, developing countries account for 60 to   12 
80 percent of world exports of commodities that are relatively labor and/or 
water intensive, such as vegetables and fruits, cotton, sugar, and vegetable 
oil.  Thus, developing country export markets for agriculture are largely in 
the North. 
   These data also show that the EU is a far more important agricultural 
market for African countries than is North America. Latin America exports a 
large share of its agricultural crops, outside of grains, to North America, as 
do a few Asian countries. While Japan and Korea are known to have 
relatively high agricultural tariffs, their agricultural import pattern appears to 
be spread across more countries. 
    The tariff rate on vegetables and fruits in the EU is twice the level as that 
in Japan and Korea, and seven times higher than that in North America 
(USDA/ERS, 2001). The observed level of sub-Saharan agricultural exports 
to the EU, while relatively large, is almost surely biased downward by these 
barriers. 
    A global general equilibrium model was developed to assess the extent of 
these barriers on international agricultural trade, the details of which can be 
found in Diao et al. (2002). The analysis focuses on the three disciplines: 
tariffs (market access), domestic support and export subsidies. The analysis 
decomposes the global effects of a full reform by type of policy and by   13 
commodity. The reforms investigated are (1) eliminating agricultural import 
barriers (tariff equivalents) throughout the world; (2) eliminating agricultural 
export subsidies throughout the world; (3) eliminating domestic support in 
the developed countries; and (4) combinations of these scenarios. 
    In terms of changes in production levels, the removal of all three forms of 
interventions (tariffs, export subsidies, and domestic support) causes 
production increase across almost all agricultural categories in the less 
developed countries as a group. 
  The effects on exports from SSA to the EU are particularly large.  The 
results show that for twenty-seven of the thirty-five country groups in the 
model, 50 percent or more of the increase in their agricultural exports is due 
to liberalizing EU agriculture.  
  Clearly, these results suggest that an open EU market is in the common 
interest of most developing countries, and particularly so for those in SSA.  
Is it likely that opening this market to SSA countries could induce “trickle 
down” institutional reform? 
 
6. The case of sub-Saharan Africa 
   Sections 4 and 5 showed that countries can benefit from globalization, but 
the process is linked to institutional change and increased openness.  The   14 
analysis of the previous section suggests substantial grains from freer 
agricultural trade.  In this section, we take a closer look at sub-Saharan 
countries and consider the effect of infrastructure, and infrastructure plus 
institutions on economic growth.  The average per capita GDP in 2001 of the 
33 countries in this region was about $567 in 1995 US dollars (IBRD).  An 
aggregate three sector (manufacturers, agriculture, service) inter-temporal 
Ramsey model is calibrated to this region's data for the year 1993, based in a 
social accounting matrix (SAM) available in the archives at IFPRI, and the 
SAM appearing in Yeldan and Roe (1995).  Analytical features of the model 
can be found in Roe (2001) and Roe et al. (2003: 9-13).  Our purpose is to 
illustrate the type of gains in real per capita income that could accrue to this 
economically depressed region over a fifty year period. 
    In order to suggest the magnitude of the possible increase in TFP, we 
draw on the paper by Gopinath and Roe (1997).  They found that about 0.69 
percentage points of U.S. agriculture's total factor productivity of about 2.1 
percent was due to public investments in infrastructure (this includes 
electrification, roads, public buildings) during 1959 - 1968 period.  
Estimates of growth in sub-Saharan Africa's factor productivity at the 
national level is very small, about 0.02 percent per annum.  This estimate 
compares to 1.0 percent per annum for the U.S. over the period 1981-1995,   15 
and 1.9% for the period 1996-1998 (Marquez, 2001).  To estimate the 
possible increase in TFP, it is simply assumed that the 0.69 percentage 
points applies to sub-Saharan Africa.  The positive TFP shock simulated is 
thus 0.69% percentage points.   
    The second simulation draws upon the results of MacFarlan et al. (2003), 
which suggests that bringing sub-Saharan Africa's institutions up to the 
mean level index of the over 100 countries included in their sample, would 
increase this regions growth in GDP per capita by 1.7 percentage points.  
The second simulation considers at TFP shock of 2.39 percent (0.69 + 1.7). 
 
6.1. The base solution 
    The rate of transition growth in GDP per capita is shown in figure 7.  Also 
show is the region's actual real rate of growth based on IBRD data for the 
period 1993 to 2002.  Excluding the year of negative growth, the model's 
estimate of the rate of growth during the years 1994-2001 appears to be a 
"reasonably" good fit to the data.  The model's steady state (long-run) rate of 
growth GDP is 0.02 % per annum per capita.  Transition growth reflects the 
growth in capital stock due to household's foregoing present for future 
consumption.  Growth declines overtime due to the diminishing returns to 
capital.   16 
    As capital accumulates, labor productivity grows, wages rise.  Land 
productivity also grows with the accumulation of capital which in turn 
causes land prices to rise over the period.  Nevertheless, growth in real 
income is small. The model estimates that sub-Saharan Africa's GDP per 
capita will rise from $567 observed in 2001 to about $589 (in 1995 dollars) 
by the year 2020, and to about $639. per capita by the year 2040.  These are 
increase of only 5.7 percent and 12.7 percent, respectively. 
    The differences in the relative evolution of output of the three sectors is 
due largely to the relative capital intensity of the various sectors.  As capital 
accumulates, the service sector benefits relative to the other sectors because 
it is relatively capital intensive.  As capital accumulates in this sector, labor 
productivity rises which allows the service sector to bid up wages.  The 
sector placed at a relative disadvantage from the rise in labor wage is 
manufacturing because it employs labor more intensively than do the other 
sectors.  In the long run, the output of all sectors grow at the same rate of 
0.02 percent per capita per year.   
 
6.2.  Experiment: the dynamic effects of infrastructure 
    The rate of transition and long-run growth in GDP per capita is shown in 
figure 1.  Long-run growth converges to about 0.71 percent per capita per   17 
annum, which exceeds the 1993 - 2001 average of 0.53 percent.  This rate is 
modest compared to the rates implied by the analysis of Rodrik et al. (2002), 
and MacFarlan, et al. (2003).  In this case, if factor productivity growth due 
to better infrastructure could have occurred in the base year 1993, per capita 
income, according to the analysis, would have been about $627.6 per capita 
in 2001, $819.2 in 2020, and about $1128.2 in 2040, all expressed in 
constant 1995 U.S. dollars.  These are increases over the path generated by 
the base solution (i.e., the status quo) of about 11 percent for 2001, 39 
percent for the year 2020, and about 76 percent for the year 2040.  
Nevertheless, these values are modest compare to the average per capita 
income reported by the World Bank for the Middle East and North Africa of 
$1,905 for the year 2001, in constant 1995 U.S. dollars.   
The manufacturing sector expands relative to agriculture, and agriculture 
expands modestly faster over the transition to long-run growth than services.  
This transition pattern results largely from the fact that the accumulation of 
capital causes an expansion of the services sector, but in spite of the growth 
in real disposable income, this growth is not sufficient to consume the 
increase in service production at "old" prices.  Consequently, the price of 
services, and by implication, the real exchange rate, falls.  This has the effect 
of releasing labor to manufacturing and to agriculture.  Since manufacturing   18 
is marginally more labor intensive than agriculture, it tends to benefit 
slightly more than agriculture.  In the long-run equilibrium, the share of 
services, manufacturing and agriculture in GDP are roughly 52 percent, 40 
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Model forecast; GDP/capita 
2001 = $650, 2020 = $1,057, 2040 = $1,844
2001 = $628, 2020 = $819, 2040 = $1,128
2020 = $589, 2040 = $639
 
Figure 1: Sub-Saharan Africa: growth in GDP per capita, base solution plus 
two simulations   19 
    This analysis, while only illustrative, suggests that infrastructure while 
related to institutional structure, is by itself, unlikely to raise the per capita 
income of sub-Saharan countries, as a group, to an appreciable level.  We 
next focus on the effect of institutions in addition to the improvement in 
infrastructure. 
 
6.3. Experiment: the dynamic effect of institutions 
    In this case, we draw upon the results MacFarlan et al. (2003) and add an 
additional 1.7 percentage points the country's rate of growth in factor 
productivity.  The effect on growth in real income per capita is shown in 
figure 7.  Initially, growth in per capita GDP begins at about 2.7 percent, and 
declines slowly as capital accumulates to about 2.4 percent per year.  Notice 
that this path exhibits much less of a decline compared to the other two 
paths.  This occurs because the relatively high rate of factor productivity 
growth greatly dampens the decline in the marginal physical product of 
capital.  Effectively, the region is able to maintain a slower decline in the 
growth rate over the same interval of time compared to the other 
simulations.   
    In the short run, TFP accounts for about 30 percent of the regions growth 
in per capita GDP, with capital accounting for about 48 percent and labor the   20 
remaining 22 percent.  In the case of agriculture, the percentages are similar, 
with TFP, capital and labor accounting for 27 percent, 40 percent and 33 
percent respectively.  In the long run, as the effect of transition capital on 
growth declines, capital's contribution falls to 40 percent, labor rises to 25 
percent and TFP accounts for 35 percent.  This pattern is in contrast to the 
base case where diminishing returns to capital occur more quickly.  In that 
case, capital's contribution to growth in GDP in the short run is 60 percent, 
declining to about 45 percent in the longer run.  Since TFP is relatively 
small, its contribution is only 10 percent in the short run, rising to 12 percent 
in the long-run. 
    If, in 1993, this region had experienced an increase in the quality of its 
institutions to a level equal to the average of the index of institutional quality 
of the mean of the over 100 countries in the MacFarlan et al. study, this 
analysis suggests that it would have enjoyed an income per capita of about 
$650 in the year 2001, $1057 in the year 2020, and about $1,844 dollars in 
the year 2040 (in 1995 dollars).  These increase correspond to percent 
increase of 10, 70 and 188 of the corresponding base period path.  
Nevertheless, the 2040 income is less than the 2001 average for the Middle 
East and North Africa ($1,905).  The comparison of this path with the base 
is shown in figure 1.   21 
    Relative to the base path, the results show that manufacturing expands 
relative to agriculture, and agriculture relative to the service sector for the 
same reasons as mentioned in the previous experiment.  Not shown is the 
growth in trade relative to GDP.  The relative decline in the price of services 
over the period releases resources to the other two sectors, the outputs of 
which are traded in international markets.  Thus, trade as a percentage of 
GDP tends to grow throughout the transition to long run growth.  If barriers 
were erected by other countries to this regions exports, growth would be 
slowed.  In the extreme case where the regions exports are held to the initial 
levels, as a percent of GDP, the regions growth pattern resembles that of the 
first experiment. 
    This analysis suggests that modest increase in TFP has relatively large 
long-run effects, but these effects take time to work through the economy.  
Time is required for capital deepening, especially when it comes from 
domestic savings alone.  The simple model here presumes that the only 
source of savings is from domestic households.  If the country's domestic 
capital markets are sufficiently well developed and diversified to allow an 
immediate inflow of foreign capital equal to approximately 18.5 percent of 
the base period capital stock, then the economy's transition to long-run 
growth would have allowed it to obtain the 50 year targets more quickly.  An   22 
economy open to foreign goods and capital, with well developed institutions 
should help to speed up the transition to long-run growth. 
 
7. Conclusions 
    The growth experience of countries during the last half of the 20 century 
suggests that "accidents" of geography and the presidents of history are not a 
poverty trap.  The evidence is also clear that institutions matter.  Institutional 
reform as Rodrik mentions (2002), does not travel well, i.e., another 
country's institution is difficult to modify and transplant to a second country.  
Institutional reform induced by better economic opportunities that increased 
openness to the world economy is surely "trickle" down reform.  These 
opportunities help create the conditions for institutional reform, but surely 
they are not sufficient. 
    Nevertheless, since institutional reform is difficult, it seems that it is also 
the case that if the agricultural policies of advanced countries not only cause 
a waste of resources in themselves, but also become barriers to helping 
induce reform, then even more pressures should be brought to bear that 
encourage their use of first-best (i.e., non-market distorting) policy 
instruments.  Surely the sub-Saharan countries have a major vested interest 
in the Doha round of trade negotiations that should be induced by more than   23 
just getting prices right.  They also should have a vested interest in fostering 
regional trade among themselves with prospects for fostering institutional 
reform. 
    Thus measures of the welfare gains from trade reform for advanced 
economies may largely entail the typical decline in deadweight losses.  For 
countries that experience an induced institutional reform, the gains are likely 
to be far larger. This may cause the indirect feed-back effects on welfare in 
advanced countries caused by trade expansion to likewise be significant. 
    We conclude that (1) initial conditions matter, but they are becoming 
easier to overcome for many of the same reasons that has driven the second 
wave of world globalization, (2) institutional change is induced by the 
potential for economic gain, and thus the incentive for change follows the 
emergence of economic opportunities, (3) however, there is no compelling 
reasons to think that societies will naturally gravitate toward good 
institutions, all else constant (i.e., bad institutions could persist indefinitely 
in static or worsening economic conditions, this is the main reason for the 
trickle down feature of trade induced institutional reform), and (4) while a 
democratic form of governance that allows for relatively free entry and 
competition among political entrepreneurs is one means of fostering   24 
institutional change, Mohtadi and Roe (2003), change can well be brought 
about by non-democratic means of governance. 
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